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2In the 1980s and 1990s, administrative reform swept through most western 
states. National, regional and local governments alike changed their organiza-
tional structure, introduced private sector management ideas and techniques, 
contracted out tasks, privatised state-owned companies, or put policy imple-
mentation at arms’ length (OECD, 1997; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). The 
Netherlands was no different in this respect. 
This chapter deals with the establishment of so-called quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organizations (quangos, Barker, 1982). There is little 
agreement on the definition of quangos. In fact, it could be argued that there 
is a continuum of quasi-autonomous organizations, ranging from contract 
agencies (see several chapters in this volume), to public bodies, voluntary 
organizations and government owned enterprises (cf. Greve, Flinders & Van 
Thiel, 1999). 
In the Netherlands, the creation of quangos is called 'autonomization' (in 
Dutch: verzelfstandiging). There are two types of autonomization, leading to 
different types of organisations (cf. Verhaak, 1997). Internal autonomization 
renders managerial freedom to units within the governmental organization. 
These units still fall however under full ministerial responsibility. The 
Dutch contract agencies (agentschappen, see Smullen in this volume) result 
from internal autonomization at national level. On local level, an example of 
internal autonomization is the introduction of contract management. Exter-
nal autonomization refers to the establishment of organizations charged with 
3policy implementation as a main task, paid by government, but operating at 
a distance from that government without an immediate hierarchical relation-
ship (Van Thiel, 2001a:5). Examples vary from the Non-Departmental Pub-
lic Bodies in the United Kingdom to the Crown entities in New Zealand. In 
the Netherlands, at the national level public bodies known as ZBOs (zelf-
standige bestuursorganen) are found. At local level, municipalities may es-
tablish so-called functional committees or establish limited companies. Fur-
ther examples will be given below.1 
 The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I will describe some characteris-
tics of quangos in Dutch government, at national and local (i.e. municipal) 
level. These data show that their number has increased strongly since the 
1980s. Secondly, this chapter offers a theoretical explanation for the prolif-
eration of quangos in Dutch government. The first part of this theoretical 
explanation has been tested before (see Van Thiel, 2001a). Here I will sum-
marize the main conclusions from that test and propose new theoretical pre-
dictions for further study. 
 
Quangos at national level 
 
At national level the two most important types of quangos are contract 
agencies and ZBOs. Because the first type is dealt with extensively else-
where (cf. Smullen in this volume), I will focus here on ZBOs. 
4Estimates on the number of quangos vary along the definition one uses. 
For example, in the UK Hall & Weir (1996) counted over 1,800 quangos at 
national level, whereas official counts only listed about 300 quangos (only 
executive non-departmental bodies). In the Netherlands a similar contro-
versy is taking place about the definition of ZBOs. In 1993, the Netherlands 
Court of Audit (NCA) counted 545 ZBOs (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995). 
Departments spent approximately 18% of the annual state budget on these 
quangos in that year. And about 130,000 people were employed by ZBOs 
then, just a little more than in the national administration at that time. 
In 2000, the number of ZBOs has dropped to 431 due to policy changes 
and mergers, but mainly because of definitional issues (Van Thiel & Van 
Buuren, 2001). In fact, the rate of establishing this type of quango has gone 
up; approximately 50% of all ZBOs in 2000 has been erected after 1993. 
Alongside ZBOs, a new category of public bodies has now been identified 
(RWTs; rechtspersonen met een wettelijke taak) listing over 3,200 organisa-
tions, including a large number of (former) ZBOs (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
2001). The distinction between RWTs and ZBOs is not very clear, even to 
experienced researchers in the field. 
The debate on different categories of quangos makes it difficult to get an 
accurate estimate. Most of the examples and facts below are based on the 
NCA study of 1993 and my own count in 2000. 
 
5Motives 
ZBOs are not new to the Dutch government. However, in the 1980s their 
number increased strongly as they were re-discovered as instruments of re-
form. Quangos are expected to be more efficient at policy implementation 
than traditional government bureaucracy. Hence, this is the most important 
motive for politicians to establish them (see table 1). That is, if a motive is 
mentioned, for in more than half of the decisions that is not the case. 
 Other motives relate to the expected de-politicized nature of policy im-
plementation by quangos and a desired reduction of the distance between 
policy implementation on the one hand and society and citizens on the other 
hand. Finally, in some cases the establishment of a quango is the endresult 
of a historical process. It is important to realize that ZBOs can be created ei-
ther by hiving off a division of a ministry, but also by hiving in a private or-
ganization into the public sector. 
 
**Insert table 1 about here** 
 
Types of quangos, tasks and policy sectors 
Quangos are charged with different tasks. Table 2 shows that the most com-
mon tasks are: quasi-judicature (cf. tribunals), paying benefits (e.g. unem-
ployment), judging quality (e.g. meat inspection), registration (e.g. of profes-
sional groups like architects) and supervision (i.e. regulators). 
6 
**Insert tabe 2 about here** 
 
Examples of ZBOs are the regulator for the telecommunications OPTA, the 
Netherlands Central Bank, the Chambers of Commerce, Police Authorities, 
the Bureau for Registration of Architects and the Councils for Legal Aid. 
ZBOs can be found in all policy sectors, but mostly in the field of Social Af-
fairs and Employment, Welfare Health and Culture, Agriculture, and Justice 
(see table 3). 
 
**Insert table 3 about here** 
 
Results 
Information on the performance of quangos is scarce. Case study based evi-
dence suggests that there is no immediate nor overall improvement of per-
formance in terms of (cost)-efficiency and effectiveness (Ter Bogt, 1997, 
1999; Van Berkum & Van Dijkem, 1997; Van Thiel, 2001a). In other areas, 
for example the quality of products or customer service, improvements have 
been obtained though. The official evaluations of the establishment of six 
ZBOs show that the expected efficiency gains are usually not obtained, but 
stress that these quangos have acquired a new, more business-like style and 
'market awareness' (Homburg & Van Thiel, 2002). For example, they are 
7more innovative and market oriented. Therefore, these reports conclude that 




The use of ZBOs at national level has proliferated in the Netherlands since 
the 1980s. The publication of the NCA report in 1995 led to a hot debate on 
the (lack of) acccountability of these bodies. As a result, new legislation has 
been developed to restrain the use of quangos (Van Thiel, 2001b). A prefer-
ence for less extreme types of quangos became evident, as the number of 
contract agencies increased from 1994 on. The absolute number of ZBOs 
dropped as a result of the aforementioned definition debate and the rise of a 
new category, the RWTs. However, the evidence shows that the rate of es-
tablishment of ZBOs has not dropped at all but has in fact increased - de-
spite a lack of evidence on their performance. This raises the question 
whether quango proliferation is a well-informed choice, or rather an autono-
mous trend. We will return to this question after discussing the establish-




There seems to be a general awareness among practitioners and academics 
8that there are many quangos at local level, but the estimates are not always 
clear (see e.g. Hall & Weir, 1996, on the UK; Greve, 1999, on Denmark; 
and Wistrich, 1999, on New Zealand). For the Netherlands, various cases 
have been described, but there is as yet no systematically collected informa-
tion on the number, types and size of local quangos. Below I will present the 




Dutch local government has a strong tradition and position within the na-
tional state system. Municipalities have autonomous tasks, which they can 
fund from local taxes or fees and other revenues. Next to these, they execute 
tasks that have been delegated to them - and are paid for - by the central 
government. Dutch municipalities thus have numerous tasks, ranging from 
refuse collection and road maintenance, to public education, health care, 
cultural activities, and social welfare benefits. To give some indication of 
the size of local governments: there are 538 municipalities (in 2000), with 
186,387 civil servants (in 1993) spending DFL 72.3 million (in 1997; Derk-
sen, 1998:10). 
The establishment of quangos at local level was part of the managerial 
reforms undertaken by Dutch municipalities from the 1980s and on. Table 4 
shows that the most important motives - if mentioned - for the creation of 
9quangos at local level were to separate policy and administration so that 
politicians, policy makers and policy implementors could stick to their core 
business. Other motives are to improve the efficiency of policy implementa-
tion, to reduce costs and enhance the quality of customer service. In sum, 
quangos are expected to reduce the workload of local administrators and 
politicians, and to increase the efficiency of service provision. 
 
**Insert table 4 about here ** 
 
Types of quangos, tasks and policy sectors 
At local level (cf. Verhaak, 1997) three types of internal autonomization can 
be distinguished: self-management, contract-management and the so-called 
Policy and Management Instruments project (PMI; Van Helden, 1998).3 In-
ternal autonomization gives freedom to manage to unit managers. The 
agreements on managerial freedoms are often laid down in a contract. These 
contracts specify tasks, budgets and sometimes also results (output) or tar-
gets that have to be met. Self-management and contract-management were 
combined in the early 1990s in the so-called PMI operation. Local govern-
ments adopted a range of instruments in an effort to improve the efficiency 
of the local administration procedures. Unfortunately, a lack of ‘managerial 
attitude’ in local governments undermined a successful and comprehensive 
implementation of PMI (Van Helden, 1998). 
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External autonomization involves charging a separate organization, at 
arms’ length of the local administration, with policy implementation. These 
new organizations can be established by hiving off a division of local gov-
ernment, or by hiving in an existing private organization. Dutch municipali-
ties can use different types of organisations. Based on public law munici-
palities can appoint so-called functional committees (e.g. school boards). Or 
they can decide to co-operate with other local governments. Finally, they 
can create local agencies (in Dutch: tak van dienst).4 Based on private law 
municipalities can establish (limited) companies, associations and foun-
dations for policy implementation or charge existing organisations with that 
task. 
Next to internal and external autonomization, municipalities can also use 
privatisation, competitive tendering and public private partnerships (PPP) to 
put service provision at arms' length. These modes of operation will not be 
discussed here any further. Table 5 shows the number of cases of internal 
and external autonomization, and other modes of service provision that were 
found in Dutch local government between 1994 and 1999.5 Recently, Dutch 
municipalities have shown a strong preference for external autonomization, 
in particular the use of private companies and foundations. 
 
**Insert table 5 about here** 
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Local governments are most prone to use quasi-autonomous bodies in the 
fields of refuse collection, culture, health, utilities, sports and recreation (see 
table 6). In the fields of education and social welfare services municipalities 
are much more reluctant to establish quangos, e.g. in the case the Social 
Benefits Office.6 
 
**Insert table 6 about here ** 
 
Results 
The evidence on the performance of local quangos is highly contradictive 
and inconclusive (cf. Ter Bogt, 1997). Most of the reviewed studies (86%) 
do not mention anything about the results, or blame the lack of (information 
on) results to a number of problems.7 The problems that are reported most 
often are: a lack of (organizational and personal) skills to change, high tran-
sition costs, continuing interference of politicians with daily activities, and 
problems with the development of performance indicators. Also, a number 
of unintended social consequences are reported, such as an increase of fees 
for services and a lack of public accountability for local quangos (cf. Hall & 
Weir [1996] on the UK). 
 
Conclusions 
It is estimated that about 50% of Dutch municipalities use quasi-autono-
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mous organizations for the execution of about 50% of their tasks (Moret, 
Ernst & Young, 1997). PMI is even adopted by 70% of all municipalities 
(Van Helden, 1998). Quangos can be said to have spread throughout local 
government. Size and political climate do not seem to matter very much in 
this respect. Quangos are charged mainly with policy implementation and 
service provision. The development of policies and the political decision 
making process remain exclusive tasks of the local administration. Some 
tasks are put at arms’ length more often than others. For example, the social 
benefits office is seldom put at arms’ length whereas in most cities refuse 
collection is charged to inter-communal co-operation or private contractors. 
There are, however, hardly any clear patterns regarding which types of 
quangos are used for particular tasks or in particular policy sectors. The di-
versity in quango use, combined with a serious lack of motives and evidence 
on the performance of quangos suggests that municipalities do not apply 
quango principles in a rational manner, nor learn from each others experi-
ence (Loeff Claeys Verbeke, 1994:30-32). How can the increase in the use 




There is no formal theory yet that explains the increase in the use of quan-
gos. The practitioner theory i.e. the assumptions underlying politicians' 
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choice to establish quangos is not considered a formal theory here.8 Instead 
a new theoretical explanation is offered below why politicians would prefer 
to use quangos rather than government bureaucracy for the implementation 
of policies. 
The model presented here was constructed by deduction, rather than by 
induction on the basis of empirical information. To carry out such an ap-
proach, I have used formal theories on the behaviour of politicians; in this 
case rational choice sociology (Coleman, 1990) and public choice theory 
(Downs, 1965; Mueller, 1989; Dunleavy, 1991). These theories were com-
bined with elements from neo-institutional economics, in particular princi-
pal agent theory (e.g. Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991). Using these elements, a 
formal model was developed to predict under which conditions politicians 
will establish quangos for the purpose of carrying out public tasks (for more 
details, see Van Thiel, 2001a). 
 A rational actor model such as presented here contains numerous simpli-
fying assumptions. It needs further elaboration to become a more complex 
and realistic model. Therefore, it should be seen as a first step towards find-
ing an explanation of quango proliferation. This first step has been tested 
statistically already and some results will be discussed below. I will then 
continue with a number of possible theoretical elaborations on the existing 
model - which have not been tested yet. 
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A rational actor perspective 
Based on public choice theory, it is assumed that politicians strive to be re-
elected. The use of quangos is expected to contribute to this goal because 
quangos can be charged with the implementation of policies that are favour-
able to voters. The advantages of using quangos rather than government bu-
reaucracy are twofold. First, members of interest groups can be appointed as 
quango board members, which ensures the support of those groups of voters 
to the politicians (patronage). Government bureaucracies are expected to be 
impartial and hence offer less (formal) opportunities to include interest groups 
into the organizational structure. Second, because quangos operate at arms' 
length the responsibility of politicians for quango performance is limited. In 
case of ill performance, there is less risk that a politician will be held account-
able and may lose electoral support. However, there is also a possible back-
lash to the use of quangos. In the case of ill performance there are fewer pos-
sibilities for intervention because of the larger distance between the parent 
department and quangos. Or intervention will lead to high (monitoring) costs, 
threatening the possibility of achieving efficiency gains. 
Politicians will have to weigh these possible benefits and risks when 
choosing an executive agent. Here they can choose either a quango or gov-
ernment bureaucracy. Which choice they make depends on the situation at 
hand. In such a constraint driven approach the impact of a number of condi-
tions has to be evaluated. 
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Contrary to common sense, political and economic conditions are expected 
not to be of influence on politicians' choice for quangos. Political ideology is 
not expected to be decisive because the aforementioned advantages of the use 
of quangos are valid to all politicians. Economic conditions are also not ex-
pected to be decisive. Quangos can be used to reduce fiscal pressure because 
they are expected to render efficiency gains. On the other hand, prosperity 
leads to an expansion of the tasks of western welfare states and hence the 
number of executive agents. So, in both cases the number of quangos goes up; 
there is no difference in the total effect. 
Characteristics that are expected to influence concern the degree of corpo-
ratism in the policy sector in question, whether elections are being held, and 
the type of task that is charged to the quango (collective good, specific in-
vestments). Elections and corporatism increase the competition for votes be-
tween politicians and are therefore expected to contribute to more quangos 
being established. The reduced responsibility for quangos leads to less politi-
cal risks in election times and thus to higher chances of being re-elected. In 
corporatist policy areas the benefits of patronage will be higher. Therefore, it 
is expected that in these areas more quangos will be established to maximize 
electoral support. Both conditions will thus contribute to more quangos being 
established. 
With regard to the tasks of quangos, two conditions are discerned that will 
lead to less quangos being established. First, it is predicted that politicians 
16
will not charge quangos with the provision of collective goods. The interest of 
voters in such goods is high. Therefore, the risk of loosing control is too high. 
Politicians are expected to leave these types of tasks to government bureauc-
racy. The same holds for tasks that require highly specific investments. Low 
re-deployability and high sunk costs, which are associated with this type of 
tasks, will force politicians to keep execution at close range (cf. Williamson, 
1989:150-151; Ter Bogt, 1994:215). 
 These six predictions have been tested (see Van Thiel, 2001a:107-111).9 
Most conditions had no effect on politicians' choice, except for tasks requir-
ing specific investments although not for all cases. In sum however, one can 
conclude that the explanatory model of the rational actor perspective is still 
somewhat weak. Therefore, the model was expanded. 
 
Imitation 
Until now it was assumed that politicians are aware of all the advantages, 
disadvantages and consequences of their choices. Or in other words, that 
they have full information. However, this does not seem realistic. It is much 
more reasonable to assume that politicians' rationality is bounded (Simon, 
1957). This would imply that they cannot be certain about the effects of 
their choice. To reduce uncertainty, individuals will seek information. Here 
two possible strategies are proposed. First, politicians can imitate what others 
have done already. They simple repeat other people's or their own decision. 
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Second, politicians can monitor the performance of previously established 
quangos to acquire information. However, monitoring requires investments 
(monitoring costs). It is therefore predicted that politicians will impose moni-
toring only if the costs are low or outweigh the disadvantages of quango use. 
 These two additional predictions were tested also. Imitation indeed 
proved to be a major cause of the increase in the number of quangos, at least 
at national level (see Van Thiel, 2001a: 120-128, for a full discussion of the 
other results). This raises two new questions; how and why does imitation 
occur? To answer these questions we need to expand the theoretical model 
above. Two strands of theory that deal with the adoption of innovations of-
fer interesting propositions on imitation. 
 
Explaining imitation 
Innovation Diffusion Theory (IDT) was developed primarily by Rogers 
(1995) to explain the adoption of new technologies by individuals. Here, I 
will expand its validity to the adoption and consequent spread of quangos by 
governments.10 
According to IDT, the adoption of innovations can be divided into five 
stages. The boundaries between these stages are not always strict or clear. 
The first stage is labelled the ‘knowledge’ stage. Potential adopters (e.g. 
municipalities) become aware of the existence of the innovation (quangos). 
This can happen quite passively (‘they just happen to come across the idea’) 
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or because they are actively seeking information for example to solve a par-
ticular problem or because they have a need for change. The motives for 
quango adoption (see table 1 and 4) show that quangos are used to solve a 
number of organizational and economical problems. Moreover, they fitted 
the new philosophy of New Public Management that was popular in the 
1980s. IDT is a functionalist theory, i.e. the instrumental value of an innova-
tion is expected to be decisive to its adoption. Technical features, such as 
types of quango, and the expected (dis)-advantages will be important. Based 
on the information governments acquire on quangos, they will form an opin-
ion on the idea (‘persuasion’ stage) and balance the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of applying it to the administrative organization. The opin-
ions of others, in particular opinion leaders, key persons within the organi-
zation and the propagators of the innovation, influence the degree to which 
they will be persuaded to actually use quangos, or not. The knowledge and 
persuasion stages are partly overlapping and hence difficult to separate ana-
lytically. 
Once it has decided to use quangos, the adopting government will have to 
deal with all the associated practical problems in the ‘implementation’ stage; 
what kind of quango will be used, in which policy field, for which task, et 
cetera. To persist in the choice for using quangos, it will seek confirmation 
and reinforcement (‘evaluation’ stage). If this last stage is passed success-
fully, quangos will become an accepted and legitimate way of working 
19
within the public domain. 
Rogers’ model of innovation diffusion can be used to describe how quan-
gos have spread through Dutch government in the 1980s and 1990s. It can-
not, however, explain why this occurred or which government organizations 
were early or late adopters. Nor can it explain why politicians choose to cre-
ate quangos, even though there is hardly any evidence that they are indeed 
more efficient than government bureaucracy. And finally, IDT cannot ex-
plain the large diversity in the application of the quango model found at lo-
cal level. This contradicts Rogers’ model, which assumes that governments 
will adopt the same type of quango for the same task because that is the 
‘best’ way. 
For such idiosyncrasies we need another kind of theory, one that explains 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying the adoption of innovations. Di-
Maggio and Powell’s idea of isomorphism (1983; see also Powell & Di-
Maggio, 1991) offers powerful ideas. They argue that in order to survive or-
ganizations will adopt the same structures and ways of working. This simi-
larity between organizations in the same field can be the result of competi-
tion or the strive for economic efficiency (‘competitive isomorphism’). Di-
Maggio and Powell were, however, particularly interested in the homogene-
ity that stems from a quest for legitimacy of one organization with other or-
ganizations in its environment. Such ‘institutional isomorphism’ occurs 
through three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
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DiMaggio and Powell stress that the three mechanisms are not necessarily 
empirically distinguishable. They may be separate processes, but they can 
occur at the same time and their effects may not always be clearly identifi-
able.11 
Coercive isomorphism is strongly related to the concept of resource de-
pendency; powerful others, such as the EU to the Dutch national govern-
ment or the national government to municipalities, demand the use of quasi-
autonomous bodies (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999:657). As the lower level gov-
ernment is dependent on the higher one, it has no choice but to adhere to its 
demands. Coercion can result from legal prescription but also from active 
financial support, rewarding those organisations that adopt the quango 
model. For example, the PMI-operation in Dutch municipalities was subsi-
dized by the Home Office (Van Helden, 1998). Coercive isomorphism 
shows that the aforementioned persuasion stage does not always imply a 
voluntary choice to adopt. 
 Mimetic isomorphism is a response to uncertainty. “In situations in 
which a clear course of action is unavailable, organizational leaders may de-
cide that the best response is to mimic a peer that they perceive to be suc-
cessful” (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999:657). Uncertainty is indicated by a lack of 
legitimacy. In the 1980s governments throughout the western world were 
faced with a decline in citizen trust and rising expectations with respect to 
the quality of public services (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000:ch.2). Administra-
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tive reform is generally seen as a response to both developments. For exam-
ple, quangos were expected to reduce the distance between citizens and the 
government thereby inducing a higher quality of customer service, which 
would eventually restore citizen trust. Mimetic isomorphism can be seen as 
one of the ways in which governments come across the idea of quangos in 
the knowledge stage (see above). However, that does not explain where the 
idea of quangos came from. 
Following DiMaggio and Powell, peer networks could be an important 
source of information. The dissemination of ideas on quangos through net-
works could reveal patterns in their diffusion. For example, governments 
can imitate each other, across boundaries or between layers. Intermediary 
platforms such as the OECD, the European Union, or the associations of 
Dutch local governments (VNG) could be important conveyors of novel 
ideas. The spread of ideas on quangos could be traced back to networks, es-
pecially networks with a high degree of participation and ties. Important 
variables in the study of such networks are therefore the degree of participa-
tion, the number of actors (and their origin), the number of ties (‘density’), 
the internal flow of information and the permeability of the network boun-
daries. 
 The spread of ideas through networks is strongly related to DiMaggio 
and Powell’s third and last mechanism. Normative isomorphism is the result 
of professionalization. The training, or socialization, of public managers 
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could for example include a favourable opinion towards quangos as a ‘mod-
ern’ form of public management. Or, governments may attract a new type of 
public manager who are more informed about the New Public Management 
paradigm. Consequently, quangos will become a more popular mode of op-
eration. Interactions between members of professions are a second source 
for normative isomorphism, for example between politicians or public man-
agers and consultants. In the Netherlands, about 52% of the municipalities 
have hired a consultant when establishing quangos (Schotman et al., 2000). 
In terms of the aforementioned persuasion stage (Rogers, 1995), these con-
sultants could be called opinion leaders or propagators. 
In sum, institutional isomorphism can help to explain why quangos have 
proliferated in Dutch local government. Coercive isomorphism could have 
played a role; powerful others force, either directly or implicitly, govern-
ments to implement particular types of quangos. Mimetic isomorphism 
could have occurred in response to a loss of legitimacy. The spread of NPM 
through government networks made the concept of quangos available. And 
as more and more governments adopted it, quangos became an accepted 
mode of operation (normative isomorphism). In the evaluation stage they 
will be convinced that they have made the right choice. Such ‘symbolic’ 
purposes of creating quangos also explain how it is possible that they con-
tinue to create quangos without clear evidence on the consequences i.e 
quango performance. Apparently, innovation adoption can serve more than 
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merely instrumental or functional purposes. Using the idea of institutional 
isomorphism, we can expand the assumptions of Rogers’ model. 
Moreover, it also becomes clear why quango proliferation can lead to 
such a large variety. The choice to create a quango will be influenced by the 
type of isomorphism and hence the source of information. The network in 
which governments participate, the type of managers it employs,12 the con-
sultant it hires, can all influence the choice to adopt a particular type of 
quango. The variation in such variables will thus affect both the prolifera-
tion of quangos, and the variety in practice.  These new predictions will be 
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Table 1 Motives of Dutch politicians to establish quangos at national 
level (N=545) 
Motive Numbera 
To increase efficiency 18% 
Closer to the citizens 15% 
Self-regulation by social groups 13% 
Execution by experts 12% 
Other motivesb 12% 
No motive mentioned 53% 
a More than one motive can be mentioned 
b Other motives are, for example: no state interference is desired; continua-
tion of a historically grown situation; affirmation of independency of ex-
ecutive agents 
Source: Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 (own calculations) 
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Table 2 Tasks of quangos at national level in 1993 and 2000 
Task Number of quangos in 
 1993 2000 
Supervision 72 (13%) 20 (5%) 
Paying benefits 94 (17%) 103 (24%) 
Judging quality 101 (19%) 48 (11%) 
Licensing 18 (3%) 15 (3%) 
Making regulation 46 (8%) 4 (1%) 
Registration 48 (9%) 49 (11%) 
Collecting fees 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Quasi-judicature 118 (22%) 125 (29%) 
Advise, co-ordinate, etc. 37 (7%) 19 (4%) 
Research 7 (1%) 9 (2%) 
Other - (0%) 37 (9%) 
Total 545 431 
Sources: Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; Van Thiel & Van Buuren, 2001 
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Table 3 Number of quangos at national level per policy sector in 1993 
and 2000 
Policy sector Number of ZBOs in: 
 1993 2000 
Cabinet of the Prime Minister 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Foreign Affairs 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 
Home Office 6 (1%) 33 (8%) 
Education, Culture and Sciencea 65 (12%) 16 (4%) 
Justice 85 (16%) 38 (9%) 
Finances 7 (1%) 5 (1%) 
Defense 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 
Housing, Planning and Environment 68 (12%) 85 (20%) 
Traffic and Waterways 24 (4%) 55 (13%) 
Economics 49 (9%) 42 (10%) 
Agriculture, Nature and Fishing 75 (14%) 37 (8%) 
Social Affairs and Employment 92 (17%) 17 (4%) 
Welfare, Health and Sporta 72 (13%) 101 (23%) 
Totaal 545 431 
a Between 1993 and 2000, Culture moved from Welfare to Education, and 
Sport went to Welfare. 
Sources: Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; Van Thiel & Van Buuren, 2001 
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Table 4 Motives for the establishment of local quangos (N=233) 
Motive Mentioned in % of cases1 
Stick to core business 26.7 
Increase efficiency 21.0 
Reduce costs of implementation 20.6 
Separation of policy and administration 14.2 
Work like a business 13.7 
Improve quality of implementation 13.0 
Reorganization of entire organization 7.7 
Advantages of scale 6.0 
Other (e.g. changes in legislation) 6.9 
No motive found 41.6 
1 in a number of cases more than one motive was given 
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Table 5. The use of autonomization, and other forms of service provi-
sion by Dutch municipalities 1994-1999 (N=181) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Internal autonomization 1 2 - - - - 
External autonomization 3 10 24 30 7 5 
Public Private Partnership - - - 1 - - 
Privatization - 5 15 7 2 - 
Competitive tendering - - 3 - - - 
Load shedding 3 3 4 3 2 - 
Unknown 1 12 27 8 2 1 




Table 6 The use of quasi-autonomous organizations per policy sector by 
Dutch municipalities (N=115) 
 Autonomization Other modes of provision Total 
 Internal External Privatized Tendering PPP Other  
Administration 6 - - - - - 6 
Culture 2 18 5 - - - 25 
Education 1 9 - 2 - - 12 
Finances 1 - 1 - - 1 3 
Health - 6 3 - - 4 13 
Housing - 4 3 - - 2 9 
Facilities - 2 1 - - - 3 
Refuse 1 23 1 1 - - 26 
Roads 1 1 - - 2 1 5 
Planning - - - - - 1 1 
Sports 1 12 6 1 - 5 25 
Traffic - 3 - 1 - - 4 
Utilities - 3 8 - - 2 13 
Welfare 2 3 - - - - 5 






1 Next to the national and municipal level, there is a third tier of government 
in the Netherlands: the provincial level. Unfortunately, there is hardly any 
(systematically collected) information on quangos at the provincial level. 
2 In total 135 articles, books and master theses of Public Administration 
graduate students were reviewed as well as six volumes of a journal on pri-
vatisation, revealing 233 cases of the establishment of quasi-autonomous 
organizations in 155 Dutch municipalities. See for a full overview Van 
Thiel (2001c). 
3 This type of autonomization is comparable to the use of contract agencies 
by national governments (cf. Pollitt et al., 2001). However, contrary to the 
national level, internal autonomization in Dutch municipalities does not lead 
to the establishment of separate units within the administration. Existing 
units are given more managerial freedom (‘a mandate’) but keep their (hier-
archical) position in the organization. At local level, the establishment of 
agencies would appear to bear more similarities with the process of external 
autonomization. 
4 Local agencies operate at arms’ length of the government, which means 
that the accountability of local politicians is limited. Their legal basis is in 
public law. Examples observed in Dutch local governments are, among oth-
ers, utility companies, hospitals and theatres. Local agencies should not be 
confused with the agencies at national level. Perhaps they can be compared 
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more to public bodies at the national level such as the Dutch ZBOs or the 
British Non-Departmental Bodies (cf. Greve et al., 1999; Van Thiel, 2001a). 
5 Unfortunately, only 181 of the 233 case descriptions contained an accurate 
characterization of the type of autonomization that occurred. 
6 For the Dutch case, this is contrary to findings at national level where im-
plementation of social benefits policies is (almost always) charged to quan-
gos. 
7 Note that not all reviewed studies aimed to describe performance, which 
could explain the lack of information on this topic in part. However, the lack 
of evidence on performance results is quite systematically, both at local and 
national level (cf. Van Thiel, 2001a). 
8 In fact, it could be argued that the fact that most quangos do not obtain 
their expected efficiency gains refutes the practitioner theory i.e. the sum of 
the motives mentioned in tables 1 and 4. 
9 Data were used on ZBOs, which had been collected by the NCA (Alge-
mene Rekenkamer, 1995) and from other secondary sources (see Van Thiel, 
2001a, for a full account). In total, 392 decisions were taken between 1950 
and 1993 involving the establishment of a quango. The data were analysed 
by a Poisson regression analysis using a time-lag (Long, 1997: ch.8; 
Agresti, 1996:80-93). 
10 My main interest here is in the process of adoption in general, not in the 
adoption of one type of quango, nor how any individual government uses a 
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particular type in practice. It should be recognised, however, that the type of 
established organization or degree of autonomy might influence the actual 
process of its adoption and diffusion. 
11 A review by Mizruchi and Fein (1999) showed that in 26 selected North-
American studies the researchers claimed to be using only one type of iso-
morphism – mimetic – but in fact described phenomena that could be attrib-
uted to normative and coercive isomorphism as well. 
12 An interesting question in this respect is what benefits public managers 
have to gain from the decision to put policy implementation at arms’ length. 
